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JUSTICE JACKSON AND THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION

Paul A. Weidner*
of the pattern of division in the present Supreme Court is
traceable to basic differences of opinion regarding the proper
role of a judge in the process of constitutional adjudication. Some
students of the Court, yielding to the current fashion of reducing even
intricate problems to capsule terms, have tried to explain the controversy by classifying the justices as either "liberals" or "conservatives."1
A second school poses the disagreement largely in terms of judicial
"activism" as opposed to judicial "restraint." It is this view that has
the greater relevance for the present discussion. C.H. Pritchett, one
of the leading exponents of this view,2 says that the judicial activist
"appears to experience a deep sense of personal responsibility for the
immediate consequences of his judicial decisions." 3 He feels that the
Court has a range of discretion, that there are alternatives available to
him, and that "he must make the choice which will give the right
result." 4 The activist does not pretend to exercise the power of judicial
review in accordance with standards imposed by the legal system; he
will apply formal legal concepts only if they assist him in reaching a
desirable goal. On the present Court, Pritchett suggests, Justices Black
and Douglas best reflect this "goal-orientation" of the activists.5 The
proponents of judicial self-restraint see a justice at his best when he
exercises the judicial power with restraint and prudence. This "functionally-oriented" view sees the Court "not as crusader or advocate but
as one of the instruments of political and social accommodation and
adjustment in a complicated governmental system." 6 Its stress "is not
on securing a result conforming to the jurist's own scheme of values
but upon adherence to appropriate judicial standards and proper manipulation of judicial techniques." 7 Justice Frankfurter, Pritchett submits, is the modem leader of the restraint school, and his views are
subjected to close scrutiny.8
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* Instructor in American Government and History, Henry Ford Community College,
Dearborn, Michigan.-Ed.
1 See, for example, McCUNE, THE NINB YoUNG MEN (1947).
2 PRITCHE'IT, THE RoosEVELT CotmT, c. 10 (1948); and the same author's more
recent CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON CotmT, cc. 10, 11 (1954).
3 PRITCHE'IT, CIVIL LlBERTIES AND THE VINSON CotmT 198 (1954).
4Jd. at 199.
5Jd., c. 10.
Gld. at 201.
7Ibid.
Sld., c. 11.
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While Pritchett's approach is basically sound, it does have the
effect of obscuring the constitutional views of Justice Robert H. Jackson, who often seems to be regarded as a mere intellectual appendage
of Justice Frankfurter. In contrast to his elaborate analysis of Frankfurter's conception of the judicial function, Pritchett, writing before
Jackson's death, 9 summarized Jackson's judicial philosophy only briefly
and then concluded, "The unpredictability of Jackson's performance
leads one to question whether he has developed any systematic theories
about . . . the judicial function." 1O This cursory conclusion suggests
the need for a deeper penetration into the general writings and judicial
opinions of Justice Jackson to discover if he had an integrated philosophy concerning the judicial function, and to appraise the extent to
which he was an advocate of judicial self-restraint. This study is an
attempt to fill that need. Its intent is not to summarize Justice Jackson's
political and judicial career; it is rather an inquiry into his conception
of the judicial function as applied to certain basic types of review situations. If we can determine this, we may have the key that will enable
us to interpret his Supreme Court experience.

The Limitations on Judicial Review
Shortly before his elevation to the Supreme Court in 1941, Jackson
presented his conception of the proper role of the Supreme Court.11
Those views reveal a general devotion to the theory of judicial selfrestraint. In describing the position of the Court in the American
system of sep~ration of powers, Jackson said that the Court has no
function except to decide "cases" and "controversies," and its very
jurisdiction to do that was left largely to the control of Congress. It
has, he continued, "no force to execute its own commands . . . . Its
Justices derive their offices from the favor of the other two branches
by appointment and confirmation, and hold them subject to an undefined, unlimited, and unreviewable Congressional power of impeachment."12 Given this vulnerable, dependent position, the Court should
avoid overt clashes with the political branches whenever possible. This
belief in the propriety of restraint was strengthened by the conviction
that the Court is an institution of distinctive characteristics that tend to
Jackson died in Washington on October 9, 1954, at the age of 62.
(1954). At another
point, Pritchett stated that "the rather erratic nature" of Jackson's opinions made it difficult
to catalogue him. Id. at 18.
11 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941).
12ra. at ix.
9

10 PRITcHBTr, C!vi:L LrnBnTIEs AND nm VINSON CounT 228-229
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make it anti-democratic.13 To avert the external adoption of a formula
for limiting judicial pretensions, Jackson would have the justices themselves work out a "corrected pattern of judicial restraint."14 To him,
it was an awesome thing to strike down acts of the legislature, and
deference to the Executive was as compelling as deference to the legislature.15 To clinch his argument, Jackson contended that time has
proved the judgment of the Court wrong "on the most outstanding
issues upon which it has chosen to challenge the popular branches."16
It was this set of conceptions that Robert Jackson brought to the Court.
Jurisdictional Limitations. We can learn much of the philosophy
of a justice by examining his attitude regarding the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court. The Constitution limits the judicial power to
"cases" and "controversies,"17 and the rules developed by the Court in
interpreting this limitation govern both the extent of the judicial power
and the power of the federal courts to entertain jurisdiction.18 From
the outset, the Court has held that it can act only when the subject is
presented in a case, and a case arises only when there are adverse litigants.10 The parties to the dispute must have a substantial interest, not
merely the general interest of a citizen in government by law.20 It
follows that jurisdiction will be taken only where the issue is real as
opposed to abstract, contingent, hypothetical, or moot, and that the
Court will not render advisory opinions. So runs the theory; but the
generality of the terms permits some latitude in their application to
specific cases. The loose interpretation given the terms by the activist
widens the area of justiciable issues, while the stricter view taken by the
advocate of restraint narrows the capacity of the Court to receive jurisdiction.
Justice Jackson's attitude on this question of standing to sue was
made clear in the series of cases where separation of church and state
was at issue. In the first of these, Everson v. Board of Education, 21
Jackson dissented but did not raise the issue of standing. In a later
case, Jackson said that the Court had found a justiciable controversy in
1s Id. at 311.
14 Id. at vii.
15 Id. at 323.
16Id. at x.
11 Art. III, §2.
18 See CORWIN (ed.), THB CoNSTITOTION OF THB UNITED STATES oF AMERICA, S.
Doc. 170, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 538 (1953).
19 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 737 (1824). See also
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250 (1911).
20 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597 (1923).
21330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947).
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the Everson case because Everson "showed a measurable appropriation
or disbursement of school-district funds occasioned solely by the activities complained of."22 But what of a case where the expenditure of
funds was more difficult to cull out from general disbursements? This
question was presented in McCollum 11. Board of Education23 which
involved the released-time program of religious instruction in the Champaign, Illinois, public schools. In this program, public school children
having parental consent attended classes in religious instruction during
the school day and in school buildings. The interest asserted by Mrs.
McCollum, who challenged the program, was that of a resident taxpayer and of a parent whose child was enrolled at the time in the public
schools. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Black ruled that Mrs.
McCollum had sufficient standing to maintain the action. Jackson, in
a concurring opinion, said that it was doubtful whether Mrs. McCollum
as a taxpayer had shown any substantial property injury, since the cost
of the program to the taxpayers was "incalculable and negligible."
Two 1952 cases afford better insight into Jackson's ideas concerning
standing to challenge constitutionality. In Doremus 11. Board of Education24 the Court avoided a decision on the validity of a New Jersey
statute providing for the reading, without comment, of Bible verses at
the opening of each public-school day. Two plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the statute violated the First Amendment establishment of religion clause. Both claimed an interest as taxpayers and
citizens, with one further alleging that he had a seventeen-year-old
daughter in school. Before appeal was taken to the Supreme Court,
however, the daughter had been graduated from the public schools. In
speaking for a six-justice majority, Jackson held that the graduation of
the daughter had rendered the claim of her parent a moot question. The
Court, said Jackson, did not sit to "decide arguments after events have
put them to rest:'' Moreover, the parent lacked substantial interest even
before the question became moot, since there was no claim that the
Bible-reading offended or injured the daughter. In disposing of the
taxpayer's aspect of the case, Jackson ruled that a taxpayer's action can
meet the test of a case or controversy "only when it is a good-faith
pocketbook action." To Jackson, the case involved a religious difference,
not a "direct dollars-and-cents injury." It was not enough that the
plaintiff "suffers in some indefinite way in common with people gen22Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 at 434, 72 S.Ct. 394 (1952).
23 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948).
24 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394 (1952).
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erally."25 The appeal, therefore, was dismissed without reaching the
constitutional question. The second case, Zorach v. Clauson,26 involved New York City's released-time program, which differed from the
Champaign plan in that the religious instruction was held outside the
public schools. In this instance, however, the Court held that no
problem of jurisdiction was posed, since the appellants were citizens
and taxpayers and were parents of children currently attending schools
subject to the released-time program.27 ln his dissenting opinion, Justice
Jackson did not question this view.
Thus it is apparent that Jackson, in dealing with the general area
of cases and controversies, believed in the wisdom of the traditional
cautionary rules dictated by the restraint philosophy.28 While few
would object to the Court's refusal to render decisions on moot questions or to give advisory opinions, there are those who feel that the Court
has been too zealous in applying the "pocketbook" test of standing to
sue, especially when civil liberties are at issue.29 But Jackson's concern
for jurisdictional limitations was not as great as that of Justice Frankfurter, the ''keeper of the Court's jurisdictional conscience."30 In Adler
v. Board of Education,31 for example, Jackson did not join Frankfurter's
dissenting argument that the teachers and parents who attacked the
New York Feinberg Law dealing with teacher loyalty lacked sufficient
interest to warrant the Court's receiving jurisdiction. Frankfurter had
also objected to the adjudication of claims before the statutory scheme
had been set in motion. To him the issue was abstract and speculative,
but Jackson apparently thought not. 32
25 Id. at 434, quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 at 488, 43 S.Ct. 597
(1923).
26 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679 (1952).
27Jd. at 309, note 4. In Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 at 255, 67 S.Ct. 1552
(1947), Jackson, quoting Brandeis, said: ''The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits." In Dixon
v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 at 147, 73 S.Ct. 193 (1952), Jackson said in dissent, "Doubt of
our jurisdiction is no justification for exercising it; quite the contrary is the rule."
28 Speaking of advisory opinions, Jackson said that the Court "early and wisely determined that it would not give advisory opinions even when asked by the Chief Executive."
Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 at 113,
68 S.Ct. 431 (1948).
2 9 See Bischoff, "Status to Challenge Constitutionality," in CAHN, SUPREME CotmT
AND SUPREME I.Aw 26 (1954).
30 PRlTCHB'lT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND nm VINSON COURT 220 (1954).
31 342 U.S. 485, 72 S.Ct. 380 (1952).
3 2 In Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242, 73 S.Ct. 600 (1953), Jackson and Frankfurter
agreed that the Michigan Communist Control (Trucks) Act should not be reviewed
because it had not yet been interpreted by the state courts. Although this case involved
exhaustion of state remedies rather than standing to sue, it does illuminate Jackson's views
on jurisdictional problems.
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In keeping with the philosophy of self-restraint in assuming jurisdiction is the doctrine that the Court is by nature incompetent to decide
questions of a "political" character. 33 While there are no simple definitions of political questions, Corwin has supplied one that should prove
satisfactory. They are questions, he says, "relating to the possession of
political power, of sovereignty, of government, the determination of
which is vested in Congress and the President whose decisions are
conclusive upon the courts."34 In each of the important political questions cases in which he participated,35 Jackson put himself on the side
of restraint by refusing to evaluate decisions of the political branches of
government.
In Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc. 11. Waterman Steamship
Corp. 36 the issue was whether orders of the Civil Aeronautics Board
which grant or deny applications to engage in foreign air transportation
were reviewable by the courts. The Civil Aeronautics Act prqvides that
such orders are subject to the approval of the President. Speaking for
a five-justice majority, Jackson said that, in the past, the courts have
refused the opportunity to enlarge their jurisdiction by "self-denying
constructions" which exempt from judicial control orders which, "from
their nature, from the context of the Act, or from the relation of judicial
power to the subject-matter, are inappropriate for review." In his view,
"the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is
political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our
Constitution to the political departments of government, Executive
and legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only
by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the
Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and
which has long been held to belong in the domain of political
power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry."37
That the termination of wars is a political question is a principle of long
standing,38 and in 1948, in Ludecke 11. Watkins, 39 the Court reiterated
33 See Frank, "Political Questions," in CAHN, SUl'REME COURT .AND SUl'REME LAw
36 (1954).
34CoRWIN, THB CoNSTITOTION oF THI! UNITED STATES oF AMERICA, S. Doc. 170,
82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 547 (1953).
35 Jackson did not participate in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 66 S.Ct. 1198
(1946), or in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 66 S.Ct. 340 (1946).
36 333 U.S. 103, 68 S.Ct. 431 (1948).
37ld. at 111.
38 See Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 43 S.Ct. 486
(1923).
39 335 U.S. 160, 68 S.Ct. 1429 (1948).
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that rule. Under a law of Congress, the President, through the attorney general, was given power to deport enemy aliens in time of war
without judicial review. Although the Ludecke case arose three years
after the cessation of hostilities with Germany, the :live-justice majority,
Jackson included, held that the determination of the cessation of a state
of war was a question for the political branches, not the courts, to decide.
In South 11. Peters,40 in a per curiam opinion (Black and Douglas dissenting), the Court ruled that the validity of Georgia's county-unit vote
system for nominating candidates in primaries was a political question.
By this holding the Court evaded the difficult question of whether the
system denied equal protection of the laws to voters in the more populous counties.
The 1952 case of Harisiades 11. Shaughnessy41 affords deeper insight into Jackson's views on political questions. Here the Court was
asked to decide whether the government may deport an alien because
of Communist Party membership which terminated prior to the passage
of the statute which authorized such deportation. 42 In his opinion for
the majority, Jackson said that any policy toward aliens "is vitally and
intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the
conduct of foreign relations. . . ." Such matters are "so exclusively
entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." It was "not necessary and
probably not possible to delineate a fixed and precise line of separation"
between political and judicial power, but Jackson saw nothing in the
Constitution that would require the Court to equate its political
judgment with that of Congress. Reform in the field of aliens had to be
"entrusted to the branches of the Government in control of our international relations and treaty-making powers."

Post-Jurisdictional Limitations. Once the Court has assumed jurisdiction in a case, the formal theory of self-restraint puts additional limitations on the judicial power.43 One of these requires that the Court
decide the constitutional issues presented only if "strict necessity" demands it. Before corning to the Court, Jackson called the avoidance of
constitutional issues the "first principle of constitutional adjudication."44
The Court, he said then, "has a philosophy that while it has a duty to
40 339 U.S. 276, 70 S.Ct. 641 (1950).
41 342 U.S. 580, 72 S.Ct. 512 (1952).
4 2 The Alien Registration Act, 54 Stat. L. 670 (1940).
48 The best formulation of these self-limitations is that

of Justice Brandeis in his
concurring opinion in Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 56 S.Ct. 466 (1936).
44 JACKSON, THB STRUGGLE I'OR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 114 (1941).
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decide constitutional questions, it must escape the duty if possible."45
In a recent case, Jackson revealed his consistent support of the doctrine
of strict necessity, and explained why he regarded ·it a sound limitation.
The relevant passage speaks for itself:
"The principle is old and deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence that this Court will construe a statute in a manner that
requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the
statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative. . . . This is
not because we would avoid or postpone difficult decisions. The
predominant consideration is that we should be sure Congress has
intentionally put its power in issue by the legislation in question
before we undertake a pronouncement which may have far-reaching consequences upon the powers of the Congress or the powers
reserved to the several states. To withhold passing upon an issue
of power until we are certain it is knowingly precipitated will do
no great injury, for Congress, once we have recognized the question, can make its purpose explicit and thereby necessitate or avoid
decision of the question."46
A second precept of self-restraint requires that legislation be presumed constitutional unless shown otherwise beyond all reasonable
doubt. Jackson early subscribed to this view of the judicial power
when, in 1940, he declared that the power to strike down acts of Congress was an awesome thing and that "power so uncontrolled is not to
be used save where the occasion is clear beyond fair debate."47 That
he did not depart from this basic position is evident again in the 1953
case of United States v. Five Gambling Devices,4 8 where he said it was
not a "mere polite gesture" for the Court to accord a strong presumption
of constitutionality to acts of Congress. It was, he felt, a deference due
to deliberate judgment of Congress that an act was within its power.49
A further logical limitation on judicial review, in the past at least,
has been a rather strict adherence to the principle of stare decisis, which
45 Id. at 305.
46 United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 at 448-449, 74 S.Ct. 190
(1953). See also United States v. Smith, 331 ·u.S. 469, 67 S.Ct. 1330 (1947). In United
States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106, 68 S.Ct. 1349 (1948), Jackson voted with the majority
in upholding a Taft-Hartley Act provision that appeared to prohibit comment on national
elections by newspapers :financially supported by unions. The majority avoided the constitutional issue by holding that the provision was not intended to outlaw political comment
by union newspapers, even though the act's legislative history suggested the opposite
conclusion.
47 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLll FOR JaDICIAL SaPRl!MACY 323 (1941).
48346 U.S. 441, 74 S.Ct. 190 (1953).
49 Jackson felt, however, that the presumption could have little practical force when
congressional leaders, in managing a bill, ''have told Congress that the bill will not reach
that which the act is invoked in this Court to cover." Id. at 449.
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Jackson has defined as "the doctrine that a court will give a word or
phrase in a contract or statute the same meaning tomorrow that it did
yesterday, that it will resort to the same principles to fashion future
judgments that it employed in past ones. . . . [I]n its absence . . .
there is no law but that day's opinion of the judge who perhaps accidentally gets the case."50 On the one hand, judicial respect for precedent is a guarantee of stability and certainty in the law; on the other,
refusal to break with precedent can place the law in a strait-jacket. The
resulting conflict between the claims of stability and progress has been
productive of much constitutional controversy.
In a discussion of stare decisis before his elevation to the Court,
Jackson said that he would like to see the Court overrule "offending
precedents," that is, cases where the Court had caused unnecessary
friction by translating its own economic philosophy into constitutional
dogma.51 He emphasized, however, that stare decisis was so important
that no lawyer or judge should depart from it lightly.52 Broadly speaking, Jackson persisted in this view while on the Court. In the realm of
constitutional construction, he accorded deep respect to the principle of
stare decisis.53 When the Court, in the first of the Williams divorce
cases,5 4 abandoned the 36-year old rule of Haddock v. Haddock, 55
Jackson protested. "This Court," he declared, "may follow precedents,
irrespective of their merits, as a matter of obedience to the rule of stare
decisis. Consistency and stability may be so served. They are ends
desirable in themselves, for only thereby can the law be predictable to
those who must shape their conduct by it and to lower courts which
must apply it." But, he went on, the Court could break with established
law, overrule precedents, and start a new cluster of leading cases to define what it meant, only as a matter of deliberate policy. And in such
a break with precedent there should be some hint of "countervailing
public good" to be served by a change.
50 Jackson, "The Law Is a Rule for Men to Live By," 9 VrrAL SPEECHES 664 at 665
(1943).
51 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JtrnICIAL SUPREMACY, xvii (1941).
52Jd. at 314.
53 In testimony given to the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1937, Jackson approved
Justice Stone's dictum: ''The doctrine 0£ stare decisis, however appropriate and even necessary at times, has only a limited application in the field 0£ constitutional law." REoRGANIZATION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary 0£ the
United States Senate on S. 1392, 75th Cong., 1st sess., part I, p. 51 (1937). In evaluating this statement, however, it should be kept in mind that Jackson was then speaking
for the Justice Department, not as a Supreme Court justice.
54Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207 (1942).
55 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525 (1906).
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In like fashion, Jackson dissented in the South-Eastern Underwriters
case56 in 1944, when the Court upset a 75-year old holding that the
business of insurance could not be regulated by Congress under the
commerce power.57 Were the Court considering the question for the
first time, Jackson argued, he would have "no misgivings about holding
that insurance business is commerce and where conducted across state
lines is interstate commerce." As a matter of "fact" insurance is commerce, but for constitutional purposes a "£.ction" has been established
that it is not. Therefore, the Court was duty bound to consider the
practical consequences of its sharp revision in constitutional theory.
Jackson concluded that to use his office "to dislocate the functions and
revenues of the states and to catapult Congress into immediate and undivided responsibility for supervision of the nation's insurance businesses" was more than he could reconcile with his view of the function
of the Court.58
The extent of Jackson's respect for stare decisis was again revealed
in the Magnolia Petroleum Co. case,59 where Jackson concurred in the
result even though it meant applying the rule of the Williams case
which he had criticized the year before. In announcing his intention
to abide by a rule he disliked, at least until it was taken off the books,
Jackson said that overruling a precedent "always introduces some confusion and the necessity for it may be unfortunate. But it is as nothing
to keeping on our books utterances to which we ourselves will give full
faith and credit only if the outcome pleases us." 60 That he would be
willing, however, to take part in overruling what he felt to be a wrong
construction of the Constitution is best illustrated by his opinion for the
Court in the second Hag-salute case,61 where the Court reversed a decision of only three years standing. 62
For the most part, Jackson preferred a rigorous application of the
principle of stare decisis in cases involving statutory interpretation. In
56 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 at 586, 64 S.Ct.
1162 (1944).
57 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 (1869).
58 Jackson suggested that, instead of overruling Paul v. Virginia, the Court could
apply the principle, already applied in other fields, that, even if the business of insurance
is not commerce, the antitrust laws could apply to the manipulation of insurance to restrain
interstate commerce.
59 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 64 S.Ct. 208 (1943).
Go Id. at 447.
61 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178
(1943).
62Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010 (1940).
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Helvering 11. Griffiths,63 for example, he declared that "a long period of
accommodations to an older decision sometimes requires us to adhere to
an unsatisfactory rule to avoid unfortunate practical results from a
change." On the other hand, where serious mistakes were made, Jackson
would have the Court reverse. In United States 11. Bryan64 he said that
the principle of stare decisis was only the "normal principle of judicial
action," and that it was "not well served by failing to make explicit an
overruling which is implicit in a later decision." It was, he said, embarrassing to confess a blunder, but it could be more embarrassing to
adhere to it. 65
These examples indicate that, like most jurists of our time, Jackson
found it difficult to develop a consistently-applicable formula for deciding between the con8.icting claims of stability and progress in the law.
But the cases cited reveal his fundamental respect for the principle of
stare decisis, and at the same time demonstrate his awareness that overemphasis on the principle would produce an intolerable rigidity in the
law. He deplored a false consistency, and when faced with difficult
situations he realistically weighed the practical consequences of a decision to abandon a precedent. He seemed to feel that stability with
progress in the law was not a contradiction in terms. In all probability,
he would have endorsed Cardozo's view that the "victory is not for the
partisans of an inB.exible logic nor yet for the levelers of all rule and all
precedent, but the victory is for those who shall know how to fuse
these two tendencies together in adaptation to an end as yet imperfectly
discerned."66
In recent times, with the constitutionality of federal legislation in
the economic realm all -but assured, the attention of the Court has
focused on the interpretation of that legislation and on the review of
statutory interpretations by administrative agencies. That the task of
giving effect to statutory provisions in specific cases is vital is generally
agreed, but getting consensus on a method of approach has proved more
elusive.67 Jackson's record on this point'suggests that he preferred a
narrow and literal construction of legislative acts, provided the result
squared with the obvious intent of the legislature. It was his view that
318 U.S. 371 at 403, 63 S.Ct. 636 (1943).
339 U.S. 323 at 345-346, 70 S.Ct. 724 (1950).
In the Bryan case, the Court distinguished its holding from that in Christoffel v.
United States, 338 U.S. 84, 69 S.Ct. 1447 (1949). Jackson concurred in the result, but
he felt that the Christoffel decision had been repudiated and should have been "forthrightly
and artlessly" overruled.
66 CARDozo, THE GROWTH oF nm LAw 143 (1924).
67 See United States v. Henning, 344 U.S. 66 at 79, 73 S.Ct. 114 (1952), where
Jackson posed the problem by quoting a revealing statement of Judge Learned Hand.
63

64
65
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all other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to the doctrine
"that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its
dominating general purpose, will read the text in light of context and
will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits
so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative
policy."68
That he believed it improper for the Court to add to or to take away
from a statute by construction is apparent in United States 11. Walsh, 69
where he objected to the Court taking too many liberties in expanding
the meaning of statutes. In Western Union Telegraph Co. 11. Lenroot7°
he declared that "it is beyond the judicial power of innovation to supply
a direct prohibition by construction. We think we should not try to
reach the same result by a series of interpretations so far-fetched and
forced as to bring into question the candor of Congress as well as the
integrity of the interpretative process." To Jackson, it was beyond the
fair range of interpretation to translate an Act of Congress "into an
equivalent of the bills Congress rejected."
In I.C.C. 11. Mechling71 Jackson criticized the Court for "legislating
out" of the Transportation Act of 1940 two provisions included by Congress. "Whether the Congressional law or the Court's amendments,"
he wrote, "are the better for the country is a complicated problem of
policy which, in my conception of our judicial function, I am not privileged to decide." In his last pronouncement on the subject, Jackson
pointed out, "Judicial construction, constitutional or statutory, always
is subject to hazards of judicial reconstruction. One may rely on today's
narrow interpretation only at his peril, for some later Court may expand
the Act to include, in accordance with its terms, what today the Court
excludes."72 On the other hand, Jackson believed that statutory construction should not be so strict as to defeat the obvious intent of the
legislature, and that the Court should not "deflect what seems to be the
course of practical and obvious justice" by resort to "metaphysical speculations. "73
as SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 at 350-351, 64 S.Ct. 120 (1943).
69 331 U.S. 432, 67 S.Ct. 1283 (1947). In New York v. United States, 331 U.S.
284, 67 S.Ct. 1207 (1947), Jackson favored a similar strict construction.
10 323 U.S. 490 at 5.08, 65 S.Ct. 335 (1945).
11330 U.S. 567 at 584, 67 S.Ct. 894 (1947).
72United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 at 635, 74 S.Ct. 808 (1954).
73 Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 at 422, 63 S.Ct. 268 (1943). See also
Jackson's dissents in United States ex rel. Marcus- v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 63 S.Ct. 379
(1943), and United States v. Henning, 344 U.S. 66, 73 S.Ct. 114 (1952). In dissent in
Massachusetts v. United States, 333 U.S. 611 at 635, 637, 68 S.Ct. 747 (1948), Jackson
said that the majority's interpretation of the Social Security Act was "unnecessarily ruth•
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Despite his general preference for a narrow and literal construction,
Jackson did on occasion sanction broad statutory interpretations, as in
Wickard v. Filburn,74 where he wrote the opinion for a unanimous
Court sustaining the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. The holding of the case was the broadest to that time on the scope of congressional power under the commerce clause and it suggested that limits to
that power were almost non-existent. Admittedly, the chief point at
issue was the constitutionality of the act itself, but to hold it constitutional as applied to crops that would never leave the farm was hardly
narrow construction.75
Judicial Review and Constitutional Principles
In its exercise of the judicial review function, the Court is confronted with the necessity of interpreting the Constitution in three
broad types of review situations: (1) enforcement of limitations arising
out of the federal system, (2) enforcement of limitations arising out of
separation of powers, including review of administrative agency decisions, and (3) federal and state civil rights questions. The design of
the present section is to examine Justice Jackson's views on these three
!imitative concepts of the Constitution.
less" and "so inconsistent with the purposes of the • • • Act that they could not have been
intended by a reasonable Congress."
Another controversial problem in the area of statutory interpretation concerns the value
of a resort to legislative history as a guide in cases where the intent of Congress is not
wholly clear from the words of the statute. In Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S.
485 at 492, 67 S.Ct. 789 (1947), Jackson said that, in the absence of ambiguity in the
statute, the Court should not resort to legislative history to determine its meaning. In
United States v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 345 U.S. 295 at 319, 73 S.Ct.
706 (1953), Jackson concurred in the result, but caustically scored the majority for its
use of legislative history in support of its decision as amounting to a "psychoanalysis" of
Congress rather than an analysis of the statute. "Never having been a Congressman," he
said, "I am handicapped in that weird endeavor."
·
74

317 U.S. lll, 63 S.Ct. 82 (1942).

7a

In Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 65 S.Ct. 1545 (1945), Jackson protested

against a narrow construction of the Sherman Act as applied to labor union activities.
Another fundamental tenet of judicial review is that "not the wisdom or policy of
legislation, but only the power of the legislature, is a fit subject for consideration by the
courts." JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 81 (1941). This limitation
is so basic to the restraint philosophy that Jackson seldom mentioned it specifically, but
whenever he felt that the Court had speculated on the political factors that may have motivated Congress his reaction was characteristically brusque. In De Zon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 63 S.Ct. 814 (1943), he said that whether the legislative
policy was wise was "not for us to say." And in the Packard Motor Co. case he again
warned the Court that the unwisdom of a statute was not adequate grounds for judicial
veto. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 at 590, 72 S.Ct. 512 (1952), Jackson
said, "Judicially we must tolerate what personally we may regard as a legislative mistake."
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. Federalism. Is judicial strategy in the realm of federalism limited
by the same rules of restraint that operate in other fields? In The
Struggle for Judicial Supremacy Jackson said that the Constitution entrusted to the Court the preservation of the equilibrium of the Federal
Union,76 and that the power to strike down state legislation that conllicts with the Constitution "rests on quite different foundations than
does the power to strike down federal legislation as unconstitutional." 77
Despite this difference, state statutes were entitled to the same presumption of constitutionality accorded federal statutes.78 In Jackson's view,
any wise national system would create states if they did not already exist,
and there is no place for hostility to the states or rivalry with them. 79
Not only are they necessary for local government purposes, but "the
'insulated chambers of the states' are still laboratories where many lessons in regulation may be learned by trial and error on a small scale
without involving a whole national industry in every experiment."80
More instructive for present purposes, however, are Jackson's views on
the operation of the restraint doctrine with respect to two important
federalism issues that frequently confront the Court.
The first of these issues concerns cases that come up on appeal from
state courts. In Herb '17. Pitcairn81 Jackson explained why he regarded
deference to state court determinations a sound judicial limitation. The
reason, he said, is found in the partitioning of power between the state
and federal judicial systems and in the limitations of the Court's own
jurisdiction. He felt that the only power of the Court over state judgments was "to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly adjudge
federal rights," not to revise state court opinions. A year earlier, in
Ashcra~ '17. Tennessee, 82 Jackson declared that in determining issues of
fact "respect for the sovereign character of the several states always has
constrained this Court to give great weight to findings of fact of state
courts."83 The Court, he added, should not lay down rules of evidence
for them or revise their decisions merely because it felt more confidence
76 JACKSON, THI! STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 9 (1941).
77 Id. at 15.
78 Jackson, in Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 64 S.Ct. 474 (1944).
79 JACKSON, THI! STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 19 (1941).
80 Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515 at 530, 65 S.Ct. 749
(1945).
81324 U.S. 117, 65 S.Ct. 459 (1945).
8 2 322 U.S. 143 at 157-158, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944).
83 In Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 at ·533, 73 S.Ct. 397 (1952), Jackson deplored
the failure of federal judges to wield their power responsibly "according to lawyerly procedures" and with "genuine respect _for state court fact finding."
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in its own "wisdom and rectitude." In Stein v. New York, 84 however,
Jackson made clear that respect for state courts was not synonymous
with abdication. The Court, he said, could not allow itself to be completely bound, "else federal law could be frustrated by distorted fact
:finding." But in the event of "miscarriages of such gravity and magnitude that they cannot be expected to happen in an enlightened system
of justice," the Court would intervene to review the weight of evidence
supporting a state court decision.85
A second type of federalism issue concerns state measures of taxation and regulation that are alleged to interfere with interstate commerce, and to Justice Jackson this was one of the areas of judicial
review that was not controlled by doctrines of judicial abstention or
deference. To him, it was in the great tradition of the Court and one of
its vital functions to prevent "local parasitic endeavors from pro:6ting
at the expense of the nation's trade." 86 In his £rst term on the Court,
Jackson gave effect to this belief by joining in the Court's action in
striking down a state law that unduly burdened interstate commerce.87
In an opinion for the majority, Jackson observed that it was "a tempting
escape from a difficult question to pass to Congress the responsibility
for continued existence of local restraints and obstructions to national
commerce." But since these restraints were "individually too petty, too
diversi:6ed, and too local," to attract the attention of a hard-pressed
Congress, the practical result was that in default of action by the Court
the states "will go on suffocating and retarding and Balkanizing American commerce, trade and industry." The freshman justice then added
a word of caution: "If the reaction of this Court against what many of
us have regarded as an excessive judicial interference with legislative
action is to yield wholesome results, we must be cautious lest we merely
rush to other extremes."88 This was but the :first of the warnings against
84 346 U.S. 156 at 181, 73 S.Ct. 1077 (1953).
85 For Frankfurter's views on respect for state court determinations, see PRITCHETr,
CIVII. WERTIES AND THE VINSON CotmT 213-215 (1954).
86 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 284 (1941).
87 Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 at 400-401, 62 S.Ct. 311 (1941).
88 Id. at 401. Jackson elaborated on these views in a majority opinion in Hood & Sons

v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 at 533, 539, 69 S.Ct. 657 (1949), where he admitted that the
state could "shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety and from fraud," even
when these dangers emanated from interstate commerce. But the states could not retard or
obstruct the flow of commerce for their own economic advantage; such regulation could lead
only to "fantastic rivalries and dislocations and reprisals."
It is interesting to note that Jackson did not always rely on the commerce clause to
prevent state restraints on interstate movement. In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62
S.Ct. 164 (1941), the Court used the commerce clause to invalidate California's famous
"Anti-Okie" laws, but Jackson, in a concurring opinion, advocated using the "privileges
and immunities" clause instead.
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extremism that were to become typical of Jackson in later years. In
1949, he summarized succinctly his philosophy concerning state interference with commerce: "If it is interstate commerce that feels the
pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies the
squeeze."89
Separation of Powers. Much of what has been said thus far lends
support to the view that the doctrine of judicial restraint is largely a
product of the system of separation of powers imposed by the Constitution. Consequently, Jackson's views concerning separation of powers
are basic to his conception of the judicial function. He expressed some
of those ideas in numerous cases,90 but he reserved his most comprehensive statement for the recent Steel Seizure Case. 91 The case is too
complex to review in detail here, but it is enough to point out that the
question presented to the Court was whether, in an "emergency" situation, the President, independently of an express congressional grant
of authority, had the power to seize certain steel mills threatened by a
work stoppage, in order to prevent discontinuance of production. 92
It has been suggested that a strict application of the restraint philosophy would require avoiding the constitutional issue,93 but the Court
majority,94 Jackson included, elected otherwise and met the constitutional issue four-square. This done, the doctrine of self-restraint dictated a decision favorable to the President unless the case against him
was clear beyond a reasonable doubt. Chief Justice Vinson, in dissent
with Justices Reed and Minton, took this position. The President, he
argued, had a choice of several statutory remedies, and that after ex89 United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U.S. 460 at 464, 69 S.Ct.
714 (1949). Another barometer revealing the extent of Jackson's willingness to apply
stricter rules to state taxation and regulation cases is provided by Pritchett's statistical analysis. Jackson participated in twenty of the thirty-seven non-unanimous cases in this area
during the 1938 through 1946 terms. In state taxation cases he voted for the validity of
the action in 50% of the cases, but in commerce cases he favored the state only 7% of the
time. In contrast, the comparable figures for Justice Black were 100 and 88%, and for
Justice Frankfurter 100 and 68%. PmTCHE'IT, THE RoosEVELT CouRT 89 (1948).
90 See the cases involving political questions and presumption of constitutionality,
cited above. See also Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 69 S.Ct. 1453 (1949); Kedroff
v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143 (1952); and the Waterman Steamship Corp. [333 U.S. 103 (1948)] and Harisiades [343 U.S. 580 (1952)] cases.
91 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S.Ct. 863 (1952).
92 For a fuller discussion of the Steel Seizure Case, see CoRWIN, THE CoNsTlTUTION
oF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, S. Doc. 170, 82d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 489-499 (1953).
93 Paul A. Freund suggests what might have been done to avoid judicial intervention
in "The Supreme Court, 1951 Term: Foreword, The Year of the Steel Case,'' 66 HARv. L.
Rnv. 89 (1952).
94 Justice Black wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Frankfurter, Douglas,
Jackson and Burton formally concurred. Justice Clark concurred in the judgment of the
Court.
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hausting the one chosen he was not exceeding his power by seizing
the steel mills, especially since, as President T rurnan had explained,
the action was a temporary expedient intended "only to save the situation until Congress could act."
Justice Jackson, in a well-reasoned opinion concurring with the
majority, rejected the dissenters' version of self-restraint and voted to
invalidate the action of the President. In support of his decision, Jackson
presented a modest, but thorough-going, interpretation of the complex
doctrine of separation of powers that was in many respects superior to
the interpretations of his fellow justices. To Jackson, an analysis of
the President's powers could not be based on isolated clauses or even
a single article removed from context. The Constitution, he said, "enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy
but reciprocity," and the President's powers are "not :fixed, but Huctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress."95 Jackson then pointed out that the Executive has only delegated powers under a Constitution that has as its purpose "not only to
grant power, but to keep it from getting out of hand." He did not
advocate a niggardly construction of these powers; they should be given
the scope and elasticity afforded by practical implications, instead of
the "rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism." But while the military powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief were broad, they
were not meant to "supersede representative government of internal
affairs." The appeal to inherent or emergency powers, long "a persuasive dialectical weapon in political controversy," Jackson thought similarly unwarranted by the Constitution. The executive power of the
President is not a "grant in bulk of all conceivable executive powers
thereinafter stated." In Jackson's opinion, the Constitution makes no
provision for the exercise of extraordinary presidential authority because
of a crisis. Moreover, the Constitution could not be "amended" by the
courts to give the President inherent powers to meet an emergency.
95 343 U.S. 579 at 635. At this point in his opinion, Jackson distinguished three
practical situations in which the President might doubt, or others challenge, his power.
First, when the President acts pursuant to an express or an implied authorization of Congress, ''his authority is at a maximum," and there is a strong presumption of the validity
of his action. The seizure did not meet this condition, because it was conceded no such
congressional authorization existed. The second situation arises when the President acts
in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority. In this situation, he
can rely only on his own independent powers, but that did not apply in this case, since
Congress had enacted several statutory policies inconsistent with the seizure. Thirdly, when
the President takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his
power is at its "lowest ebb." This, in Jackson's view, was the type of situation presented
by the seizure.
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With the office of President already powerful, Jackson did not see how
it could be harmed if the Court refused to supplement it further. From
this review it is apparent that Jackson had succeeded, in his own mind
at least, in equating a decision circumscribing executive action with his
belief in the efficacy of judicial restraint. It is equally apparent that,
faced with a situation that prevented deference to both political
branches simultaneously, Jackson would have the Court seek a solution that would preserve the equilibrium implicit in the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Another separation of powers issue concerns the extent to which
the courts should review determinations by administrative agencies.
While attorney general, Jackson argued that the courts should look
upon these agencies not as interlopers but as partners in achieving the
objectives set forth in the statutes.96 These fact-£nding tribunals, he
contended, were created to perform diverse tasks for which the courts
were ill-suited. If the two were to be partners, the courts should limit
themselves to de£ning the scope of authority granted in the statute, to
preventing arbitrary procedure, and to examining the record to ascertain whether the evidence was adequate to sustain the agency's £ndings
of fact. Otherwise, judicial deference meant bowing to the expertness
of the agencies in economic and social matters and acceptance of their
£ndings where sustained by the evidence. Jackson seemed to realize
that refusal to grant a certain degree of £nality to their decisions would
render administrative agencies superfluous or destroy their effectiveness.
As an assqciate justice, Jackson did not substantially alter his earlier
position.97 In 1942, in dissent in United States
Carolina Freight
98
Carriers Corp., he said that the Court should not substitute its "own
wisdom or unwisdom" for that of administrative officials who have not
exceeded their powers. And in a 1944 case,99 he declared that the
Court should not substitute inferences of its own for those drawn by
the I.C.C. 100 On the other hand, Jackson protested against excessive

v.

96 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 267-268 (1941).
97 For statistics suggesting that Jackson was more favorable to the I.C.C., and less
favorable to the S.E.C., than to the other agencies, see PRITCHE'IT, THE RoosBVELT CounT

190 (1948).
98 315 U.S. 475 at 495, 62 S.Ct. 722 (1942).
99 Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 1,
64 S.Ct. 842 (1944).
100 Jackson expressed similar views in ICC v. Jersey City, 322 U.S. 503, 64 S.Ct. 1129
(1944), and in Webre Steib Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 324 U.S. 164, 65
S.Ct. 578 (1945). In New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 at 359, 67 S.Ct. 1207
(1947), however, Jackson said he was unwilling to allow the ICC to reshape the national
economy.
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cooperation with administrative agencies. In the second Chenery
case,1°1 where the Court sustained an S.E.C. order it had rejected
earlier,1°2 an irritated Jackson said that the administrative process warranted fostering as a good way of applying law in specialized fields,
but that its effectiveness was threatened when it was used "as a method
of dispensing with law in those fields." 103 Obviously, Jackson's conception of the partnership between court and agency would not leave
the Court a silent or junior partner. This is decidedly less judicial
restraint than that advocated by Justice Frankfurter in reviewing administrative agency decisions. In a 1940 opinion, Frankfurter said
that "Congress which creates and sustains these agencies must be
trusted to correct whatever defects experience may reveal. Interference
by the courts is not conducive to the development of habits of responsibility in administrative agencies."104
Civil Rights. Unquestionably, the most significant constitutional
issues that confronted the Court during Jackson's incumbency were
those relating to civil liberties, where the record of the Court demonstrates that radically different judicial values operate.105 Hence, Jackson's conception of the judicial function as applied to civil liberties
problems forms a vital part of his judicial philosophy. In The Struggle
for Judicial Supremacy Jackson asserted that the presumption of validity
which attached to legislative acts was "frankly reversed" in cases of
interference with free speech and free assembly. By intervening here,
the Court "restores the processes of democratic government; it does not
disrupt them."106 In 1943, when the compulsory Hag-salute issue came
up for the second time, in West Virginia v. Barnette,1° 1 Jackson was
given an opportunity to put his earlier views to the test, and he responded by writing an eloquent defense of freedom against legislative
encroachment. In his opinion for the majority, Jackson declared that
it was the very purpose of the Bill of Rights "to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." It was a "commonplace" that sup101 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 67 S.Ct. 1575 (1947).
102 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 63 S.Ct. 454 (1943).
1os 332 U.S. 194 at 218. See also FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 64
S.Ct. 281 (1944).
104FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 at 146, 60 S.Ct. 437 (1940).
105 For a detailed discussion of these issues, see the two works by Pritchett, cited in
note 2 above.
106 JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 285 (1941).
101319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1943).

586

MrcmGAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 53

pression of op1mon was constitutional only "when the expression
presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the state is
empowered to prevent and punish." To sustain the compulsory Hagsalute, Jackson continued, the Court was "required to say that a Bill
of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind,
left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in
his mind:' Freedom to differ, he concluded, is not limited to things
that do not matter much. The test of its substance is the "right to differ
as to things that touch at the heart of the existing order."
Although he gave unqualified support to the freedom of religion
claims in the Barnette case, Jackson objected when the Court extended
the protection of the Constitution to the secular activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses.108 In Prince v. Massachusetts1° 9 he said that the
basic difference of opinion revolved around "the method of establishing
limitations which of necessity bound religious freedom." His own view
was that the limits began to operate whenever religious activities began
"to affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public." Moneyraising activities on a public scale are "Caesar's affairs" and may be
regulated by the state; such cases do not even present issues of freedom
of religion. 110
Jackson's sincere and realistic attempts to balance liberty and order
in practice forced him into numerous other dissents from what he
regarded as too absolutistic interpretations of First Amendment freedoms. In T erminiello v. Chicago111 he sharply rebuked the Court for
reversing the conviction of T erminiello for breach of peace. The Court,
he said, seemed to regard liberty and order as enemies, and "to be of
the view that we must forego order to achieve liberty." But the choice
is not between order and liberty; it is ''between liberty with order and
anarchy without either." There is a danger, he warned, "that, if the
Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom,
it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact."
Dissenting in Kunz v. New York112 Jackson again voiced concern for
the ability of the local community to pres~rve order. Should emergen10s See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870 (1943); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862 (1943); and Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157, 63 S.Ct. 877 (1943).
100 321 U.S. 158 at 177, 64 S.Ct. 438 (1944).
110 To Jackson, the local regulation of sound-trucks was also a police matter, rather
than a problem of free speech. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148 (1948),
and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448 (1949).
111 337 U.S. 1 at 14, 37, 69 S.Ct. 894 (1949).
112 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312 (1951).
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cies arise on the streets and the situation threaten to get out of hand,
he saw no reason why the police could not require a speaker, "even if
within his rights, to yield his right temporarily to the greater interest
of peace."113
In the field of state criminal cases, two judicial values influenced
Jackson's attitude. One of these, discussed above, is the deference he
felt was due to the judgments of state courts; the second concerns his
views on the relation between the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the guarantees of the Federal Bill of Rights. The
traditional position has been that the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause against state action included the
rights protected by the First Amendment against federal action, but
that it did not include the rights guaranteed in the remainder of the Bill
of Rights amendments.114 In 1947, in Adamson v. California,1 16 the
Court, in a five to four decision, held that the due process clause did
not draw all the rights of the Federal Bill of Rights under its protection.116 As a result of this ruling, the Court, in deciding state criminal
cases, has to fall back on its conception of fundamental principles of
liberty and justice. But why include the First if not the Fourth through
Eighth Amendments? Even if historically sound, this position appears
short on logic, and it seemed to bother Justice Jackson. In the Barnette
and T erminiello cases, he did not object to the inclusion of the First
Amendment guarantees, but in 1952, in Beauharnais v. Illinois,111 he
deserted that position. Although he admitted that the Fourteenth
Amendment was "enigmatic and abstruse," he was nonetheless convinced that the "Fourteenth Amendment did not 'incorporate' the
113 Id. at 301. In the opinion for the majority in Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 72 S.Ct. 725 (1952), Justice Frankfurter held that the Illinois legislature had reasonable grounds to pass a group libel law. Justice Jackson, however, adopted the position that
criminal libel laws were "consistent with the concept of ordered liberty," only if surrounded
by adequate safeguards to prevent invasion of freedom of speech. Because he felt the law
as applied to Beauhamais lacked these safeguards, Jackson dissented from the majority ruling.
114For related cases, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925),
and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937).
115 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672 (1947).
116 In his scholarly opinion in the Adamson case, Justice Frankfurter attacked as
historically invalid the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of
Rights. Justice Black felt that ''history conclusively demonstrates" that the Fourteenth
Amendment intended a full incorporation of the Bill of Rights. For evidence showing
Black's position to be historically untenable, see Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding," and Morrison, " ••• The
Judicial Understanding," 2 STANFORD L. REv. 5 and 140, respectively (1949). Professor
Crosskey upholds Black's view in his POLITICS AND THE CoNsnTUTION IN THE HISTORY
OP THE UNITllD STATES, vol. 2, 1381, n. 11 (1953).
111 343 U.S. 250 at 288, 72 S.Ct. 725 (1952).
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First," and that "the powers of Congress and of the States over this
subject are not of the same dimensions ...."
The extent of Jackson's deference to state court judgments in criminal cases is best illustrated by the confession cases, where the chief
problem has been to determine the point at vyhich the questioning of
suspects becomes coercive. In Ashcra-ft 11. Tennessee118 Jackson contended that interrogation per se is not an "outlaw," and that all questioning is inherently coercive. And in a 1949 case,1 19 he said that, if
the right of interrogation be admitted, then the Court should leave to
trial judges and juries to decide individual cases, unless they show some
want of proper standards of decision. He did not think the Court
should "increase the handicap on society."120
Each of the preceding cases came to the Supreme Court on appeal
from state court decisions and, as suggested, this is one type of case
governed by the restraint doctrine, provided the states observed the
standards embodied in the concept of ordered liberty. But what of
federal legislation alleged to violate individual rights? In American
Communications Association, C.I.O. 11. Douds,1 21 the Court sustained
the "non-Communist affidavit" provision (section 9h) of the TaftHartley Act, against claims that it violated the First Amendment. In
his ~xcellent partial dissent, Justice Jackson reviewed at length the aims,
methods, and nature of the Communist Party. From this, he concluded
that Congress had reasonable grounds for requiring labor union officers to disclose membership in, or affiliation with, the Communist
Party. But the additional requirement of section 9h, that labor union
officers must swear that they do not believe in overthrow of government by force or other illegal means, was a different matter. In Jackson's opinion, Congress had no power to proscribe any opinion or belief "which has not manifested itself in any overt act." The law may
lay hold of a citizen when he acts illegally, but "we must let his mind
alone."
In Dennis 11. United States1 22 Jackson concurred in a majority opinion upholding the validity of the Smith Act of 1940 and of the convictions under it of the eleven Communist leaders in New York. A full
11s 322 U.S. 143, 64
110 Watts v. Indiana,

S. Ct. 921 (1944).
338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347 (1949).
120 Id. at 62. Since 1949, the balance on the Court has shifted closer to Jackson's
views that society was being handicapped by the excessive protection given to criminals.
See Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 72 S.Ct. 141 (1951), and Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181, 72 S.Ct. 599 (1952).
121339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950).
122 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951).
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review cannot be attempted here, but the case is important for the clues
it offers concerning Jackson's civil rights philosophy, particularly with
respect to the "clear and present danger" doctrine. That test for deciding free speech cases was £rst announced by Justice Holmes in 1919123
and was embraced whole-heartedly by the liberal Court after 1937. In
1943, in the Barnette case, Jackson called the clear and present danger
test a "commonplace," but he emphasized that it meant that suppression of opinion is tolerated only when the speech creates a clear and
present danger "of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent
and punish."124 The failure of the majority to apply the latter half of
the doctrine in later cases began to disturb Jackson. In the Terminiello
case, he argued that the Court had not only abandoned the correct use
of the clear and present danger test, but the "fighting words" concept
of the Chaplinsky case125 as well, and had replaced them with "a dogma
of absolute freedom for irresponsible and provocative utterance...."126
Shortly before the Dennis case, in Kunz v. New York,1 21 Jackson
rejected altogether the application of the clear and present danger
doctrine and advocated using the "fighting words" concept instead.
In his concurring opinion in the Dennis case, Jackson said that the
"clear and present danger" test was an "innovation" by Justice Holmes
for use in cases arising before the "subtlety and efficacy of modernized
revolutionary techniques" had been revealed. It was "a test for the
sufficiency of evidence in particular cases," which Jackson said he would
save "for application as a 'rule of reason' in the kind of case for which
it was devised." This included "hot-headed speech on a street comer,
or circulation of a few incendiary pamphlets ... or refusal of a handful
of school children to salute our flag." But he felt that the approach to
the problem of a nationwide and well-organized conspiracy had to be
more realistic. No doctrine could be sound that would require the
Court to make prophecies about the probability of success of the Communist movement. The judicial process "simply is not adequate to a
trial of such far-flung issues. The answers given would reflect our own
123 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 at 52, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919). There Holmes
said: "The question in every case is whether the words us!ld are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."
1 2 4 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 633, 63 S.Ct.
1178 (1943). Italics added.
125 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942).
1 2 6 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 at 28, 69 S.Ct. 894 (1949).
121 340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312 (1951).

•

590

MicmoAN LAw R:svmw

[ Vol. 53

political predilections and nothing more." The clear and present danger
test, then, was inappropriate for cases of this kind.128
In cases involving aliens, the restraint philosophy, as Jackson
pointed out in the Harisiades case, requires a presumption in favor of
the political branches. But Jackson did not permit his deference to
legislative and administrative policy to produce harsh or absurd results.
When the Court upheld the exclusion, without hearing, of Ellen
Knauff on the ground that her admission would be prejudicial to the
interests of the United States, Jackson dissented.129 In protesting the
action of the attorney general, Jackson said he did not feel Congress
had meant to authorize the "abrupt and brutal exclusion of the wife
of an American citizen without a hearing." The Mezei case130 was
not too dissimilar, except that, after the exclusion order, Mezei had
been unable to gain admission elsewhere and had remained in detention for twenty-one months. The lower courts had ordered release
through a habeas corpus proceeding, but the Supreme Court reversed.
In dissent, Jackson admitted the right of administrative detention, but
to detain an alien without a hearing or fair notice of charges was a
denial of due process of law.
In federal criminal prosecutions, the chief source of judicial disagreement has been the searches and seizures provision of the Fourth
Amendment, and some unusual alignments have resulted.131 Justic~
Black and Douglas, for example, are often unmoved by civil liberties
claims arising under the Fourth Amendment, while Jackson's sensitiveness on that score virtually elevated protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures to a "preferred position." In the light of his views
on state law enforcement, Jackson's position on Fourth Amendment
cases is a little difficult to fathom. But, as he reasoned in United States
v. Di Re,1 32 the forefathers designed our Constitution "to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance, which they
seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people than the escape
of some criminals from punishment."133
Although brief, this review of civil liberties cases discloses that
Justice Jackson was neither doctrinaire nor extremist in his views. He
12s Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 at 567-570, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951). Since
the statute outlawed conspiracy, Jackson thought the law of conspiracy appropriate for cases
of this kind.
129 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S.Ct. 309 (1950).
130 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625 (1953).
131 See Table XVII in PmTcHE'IT, THE RoosBVELT CotmT 141 (1948).
132 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222 (1948).
13a Id. at 595. See also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098 (1947).

1955]

JACKSON AND THE JUDICIAL fuNCTION

591

believed that the Court's day to day task was "to reject as false, claims
in the name of civil liberty which, if granted, would paralyze or impair
authority to defend existence of our society, and to reject as false, claims
in the name of security which would undermine our freedoms and open
the way to oppression."134 Neither a mechanical application of the
preferred status doctrine nor an indefensible hostility to individual
rights would do. And a Court governed by this sense of self-restraint,
Jackson contended, "does not thereby become paralyzed. It simply
conserves its strength to strike more telling blows in the cause of a
working democracy."135

The Court and the Living Constitution
When Jackson became an associate justice in 1941, the Court had
already worked out the "corrected pattern of self-restraint'' proved so
necessary by the constitutional history of the preceding decade. The
"struggle for judicial supremacy" had entered a new era. With the war
and its aftermath came new conditions, so that today the fundamental
question has become: what should be the role of the Supreme Court
and judicial review in a democratic nation functioning under "cold war"
conditions? A justice's answer to that question is in large measure the
sum of his judicial philosophy. To those firmly convinced of the antidemocratic character of judicial review, the answer might be that the
restraint philosophy logically requires judicial abdication in favor of
majority rule. Others, such as Charles P. Curtis, contend that the
function of the Court is to "interpret for us and declare to us the immanent component in our constitutional law . . . [and] to mediate
between this immanent component and the other component which
is imposed upon us by the rule of a sometimes hasty, occasionally hysterical, and too often selfish majority."136 A Court actuated solely by
the restraint doctrine is patently incapable of playing this statesmanlike
role advocated by Curtis. What was Justice Jackson's conception of
the utlimate role of the Supreme Court in the middle of the twentieth
century?
In The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy Jackson said he recognized
"that constitutional law is not a fixed body of immutable doctrine."137
134 American Communications Association, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 445, 70
S.Ct. 674 (1950).
135 JACKSON, THB STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 285 (1941).
136 Cmtis, "Review and Majority Rule," in CAHN, Su.PREME CounT AND SUPRl!ME
LAW 184 (1954).
137 JACKSON, THB STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SuPREMAcY, xiv (1941).
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He felt then that it was the right of his generation "consciously to
influence the evolutionary process of constitutional law, as other generations had done."138 And future generations should give the precedents of his time "only the respect due to the deeds of men who with
earnest heart and troubled mind have sought gropingly but honestly
for what was best for their day."139
During his tenure on the Court, particularly in later years, Jackson
continued to search with a troubled mind for what was best for the
times. To him, there were hosts of compelling reasons for exercising
the judicial review function with restraint and caution, but he did not
permit his respect for the political branches to become judicial abdication. There were still relevant and vital tasks to be performed by the
Court in composing conflicts arising out of the federal system, separation of powers, and the relations between the government and its
citizens. The notion that the Court should abdicate its function in
preserving these equilibriums was unacceptable to Jackson. That he
frequently refused to defer to the political branches is clearly evident
in the cases involving state interference with interstate commerce, in
the Steel Seizure Case, and in numerous cases in the :field of civil
liberties. His insistence on the validity of judicial restraint has alienated some, but his application of the doctrine was less dogmatic than
that of Justice Frankfurter.
· On the other hand, Jackson objected vigorously to the activist's
unconcern for :fixed principles and for "lawyerly procedures." In
Brown v. Allen140 he criticized "ad hoc determination of due process of
law issues by personal notions of justice instead of by known rules of
law." He admitted that considerable uncertainty was inherent in
decisions which purport to interpret "cryptic and vagrant" constitutional provisions, but he thought it regrettable that interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment had become "more or less swayed by
contemporary intellectual fashions and political currents."
But what of those parts of the Constitution, such as the establishment of religion clause, where the legal propositions are less concrete
than procedural due process? In his concurring opinion in the McCollum case, Jackson admitted that these imprecise. propositions presented greater problems. "It is idle to pretend," he said, "that this task
is one for which we can :find in the Constitution one word to help us
as judges to decide where the secular ends and the sectarian begins in
13s Ibid.
130 Id. at xvi.
140 344 U.S. 443

,,,
at 532, 73 S.Ct. 437 (1953).
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education .... It is a matter on which we can :6.nd no law but our own
prepossessions." In objecting to the sweeping nature of the Court's
holding, Jackson's own prepossessions induced him to attempt to balance the equities of the situation. In his opinion, the Court should
"leave some flexibility to meet local conditions, some chance to progress
by trial and error," and not lay down a rigid, "unchanging standard for
countless school boards."141 This effort to avoid extremes and to work
out pragmatically solutions for problems as they are presented to the
Court suggests that moderation lay at the heart of Jackson's judicial
philosophy.
Conclusions

The most striking feature of Justice Jackson's judicial philosophy is
that it can only with great difficulty be made to conform to any of the
neat and currently-popular classi:6.cations of Supreme Court justices.
There is considerable evidence that Jackson was, along with Frankfurter, a strong supporter of judicial self-restraint. But conclusions
drawn from this must of necessity be tempered by substantial evidence
to the contrary, for his reaction to some classes of cases was distinctly
"activist." The view that he was a conservative has to gloss over his
many liberal opinions; while the charge that he was anti-libertarian
cannot be sustained, if by that it is meant to suggest he was fundamentally hostile to the rights of individuals. To classify him as "less-libertarian" is to ignore the complex of factors that color the adjudication
of most civil rights claims that get as far as the Supreme Court. Fortunately, the dilemma is more seeming than real. The way out is to abandon attempts to squeeze the justices into these deceptively precise
categories.
Jackson was an advocate of caution and prudence in the exercise
of the judicial review function, but he was decidedly not a doctrinaire
crusader. His approach to the international Communist conspiracy,
to problems of law enforcement, and to civil liberties was pragmatic,
clear-headed and realistic. Through it all, he rarely permitted himself
to forget his conception of the obligations that weighed on him as a
judge. His genuine efforts to compose the conflicting claims of liberty
and order, his deference to the political branches ( when warranted by
the facts), and his deference to state courts (imposed by his notions as
to the nature of federalism) often made him appear less-libertarian than
141 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 at 237-238, 68
S.Ct. 461 (1948).
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Justices Black and Douglas. But his concern_ was more for the facts
of a case than for a decision that might give results pleasing to him.
The classification of Supreme Court justices as advocates of either
judicial activism or judicial restraint, and the use of statistical devices
to facilitate the process, can be a helpful approach to some problems of
constitutional law. But it is inadequate to the task of determining the
judicial philosophy of a particular justice. Jackson, for one, cannot be
so readily pigeonholed. The statistical devices usually unveil him as
both a conservative and an advocate of self-restraint; yet when all is
said that such devices can say, Jackson remains erratic and unpredictable to the disconcerted score-keeper. But why should unpredictability
be suspect? In times of overshadowing change, a justice can ill-afford
to champion a single, inRexible set of values. If Jackson's judicial
philosophy was not always fully integrated and consistent, if he sometimes expressed uncertainty about the best way to apply the constitutional law of a free society, one can feel much sympathy for him. Only
the ideologist has ready-made solutions for novel and complex problems.
To maintain with Justice Jackson that the Court should restrain
itself rather than engage in affirmative policy creation is not to assign
the Court a lesser role. Just as Congress is probably at its best when
it succeeds in achieving an equilibrium of conflicting interests, so may
the Court be at its £nest when it preserves the equilibriums of our
system of government. Perhaps this is the highest judicial statesmanship. If this be so, then membership -on the Court calls for a sense of
sober responsibility, humility of judgment, and moderation of viewpoint. Justice Jackson's judicial career demonstrates that he possessed
all of these qualities.

